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Abstract
This paper investigates the difference in the health conditions and the health care consumption of uninsured
individuals as compared to individuals with private insurance, using a nationally representative data set of inpatient
hospital admissions from the US. In line with the previous literature, our results indicate that uninsured individuals are,
on average, in worse health conditions. However, if we compare individuals within the same diagnosis category, the
uninsured are actually healthier, with a lower number of chronic conditions and a lower risk of mortality. This indicates
that the uninsured are admitted to the hospital only for more serious conditions. In addition, our results show that
uninsured individuals consume less health care. In particular, conditional on being admitted to a hospital and
controlling for health conditions, the uninsured have lower total charges, fewer procedures, and a higher mortality rate.
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Background
The Affordable Care Act is the most comprehensive re-
form of the U.S. healthcare system in the last decades
and, when fully implemented, it is expected to have a
substantial impact on the healthcare system. Moreover, a
key motivation for the reform was to provide coverage
to the millions of Americans without health insurance.
However, there is no agreement in the literature about
the health conditions of the uninsured or about how the
reform will affect health care costs. Therefore, the pur-
pose of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive
analysis of the health conditions and the health care
consumption of uninsured individuals as compared to
individuals with private insurance.
As in any other insurance market, there are important
information problems in the health insurance market.
First, the adverse selection problem predicts that indi-
viduals with a higher probability of requiring medical
care are more likely to buy health insurance. This pre-
diction would imply that the uninsured are healthier
compared to the insured. However, the health condition
of an individual is not the only determinant of whether
or not an individual buys health insurance. The other
key factor is income, as individuals with low incomes
may not be able to afford health insurance. Therefore, it
is not clear if the individuals with no insurance are in
better or worse health conditions than the individuals
with health insurance.
In addition, there may be a two-way interaction between
health conditions and insurance status. The existing litera-
ture indicates many individuals without health insurance
are not getting the health care required to treat existing
conditions and to keep existing conditions from becoming
more serious. For instance, uninsured individuals are less
likely to get preventive care such as diagnostic tests and
are more likely to be admitted to a hospital for conditions
that do not require hospitalization if treated in a timely
way [14]. The existing evidence concerning the health
conditions of the uninsured is limited, as it is derived from
the analysis of survey data [6]1 or from the analysis of
particular conditions such stroke [13].
Second, the moral hazard problem implies that indi-
viduals with health insurance consume more health care.
There are many studies that show health insurance in-
creases health care consumption. For instance, in the
classic RAND Health Insurance Experiment, individuals
with more generous health insurance plans had higher
health care expenditures [2]. In a similar study, based on
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, the authors
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conclude that individuals with health insurance had
higher health care utilization [8].
Some researchers, on the other hand, argue that health
insurance may alter the type of care individuals get by
increasing primary and preventive care and decreasing
the use of the Emergency Department (ED), which is
quite costly. For instance, Kolstad and Kowalski [9] and
Miller [11] investigate the effects of Massachusetts’s
health care reform and show that the reform, which de-
creased the number of uninsured individuals, resulted in
a decrease in the number of Emergency Department
visits and a decrease in the number of hospital admis-
sions originating in the Emergency Department.
In this paper we use the National Inpatient Sample
(NIS) database, which is hospital inpatient administrative
data. There are some advantages and disadvantages asso-
ciated with using this database. A disadvantage of using
inpatient administrative data is that we only observe in-
dividuals who are admitted to the hospital. Therefore,
we investigate the health conditions and health care
consumption of the uninsured, conditional on being ad-
mitted to the hospital. Given the nature of the data, we
will not be able to say much about adverse selection,
although we present some indirect evidence. In particu-
lar, conditional on being admitted to a hospital, there
are systematic differences in the distribution over health
conditions between the insured and the uninsured.
A key advantage of using inpatient administrative data
is that an inpatient record provides comprehensive infor-
mation about the health conditions and the health care
consumption of an individual. Therefore, the question
we will consider is whether individuals with no insur-
ance consumes less health care than individuals with
private insurance, conditional on being admitted to a
hospital and after carefully controlling for the health
conditions of the individuals. As has been noted in the
literature, it can be challenging to identify the causal
effect of having health insurance on health care con-
sumption because insured and uninsured individuals
may have different characteristics. Hence, our identifica-
tion strategy is based on carefully controlling for health
conditions, essentially comparing the health care con-
sumption of individuals with the same set of diagnoses.2
Our analysis reveals that uninsured individuals are, on
average, in worse health conditions. In particular, unin-
sured patients have a higher number of diagnoses and
chronic conditions and a higher severity of illness and
risk of mortality. However, once we control for the pri-
mary diagnosis, the uninsured are actually in better
health conditions. This indicates a clear selection bias,
where the uninsured are more likely to be admitted to
the hospital for more serious health conditions. More-
over, uninsured individuals are considerably more likely
to be admitted to the hospital through the Emergency
Department, and they have higher mortality rates.
Surprisingly, the higher mortality rates for the uninsured
do not go away when we control for health conditions,
including the full set of diagnoses. We conjecture that
the quality and/or intensity of the health care they re-
ceive is potentially different from the insured. In fact,
our results show that, conditional on being admitted to
the hospital and after carefully controlling for health
conditions, uninsured individuals have lower total
charges, receive fewer procedures, and are less likely to
get a major procedure or an operating room procedure.
Related literature
The related existing literature can be organized in terms
of the health conditions and the health care consump-
tion of the uninsured, as compared to individuals with
insurance. As mentioned previously, there are important
information problems in the market for health insur-
ance, which make it challenging to identify the causal
effect of health insurance on the consumption of health
care. For instance, if the less healthy individuals are
more likely to purchase health insurance, it may be diffi-
cult to identify the health insurance effect without care-
fully controlling for the health conditions of an individual.
For this reason, several approaches have been used in the
literature, including randomized experiments and natural
experiments resulting from policy decisions.3
The best well-known randomized experiments are the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment and the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment. The two experiments
investigate the effect of health insurance on the con-
sumption of health care, but there are some important
differences. In the RAND experiment, every individual
in the study was randomly given a health insurance plan,
where the plans had various combinations of deductible
and coinsurance rate (but the plans had a relatively low
maximum for out-of-pocket expenditures). The study
investigated how the generosity of the plan, in terms of
its cost sharing structure, affected health care expendi-
tures [2]. A particular focus of the RAND experiment
was to estimate the out-of-pocket price elasticity of de-
mand for health care expenditures, but the more general
results showed that individuals respond to out-of-pocket
prices when making health care decisions.
The Oregon experiment involved the use of a lottery
to expand Medicaid access to many uninsured low-
income individuals. In contrast to the RAND experi-
ment, in which individuals were randomly assigned to
multiple insurance plans with marginal variations in cost
sharing, in the Oregon experiment individuals were
essentially randomly assigned to one health insurance
plan (Medicaid) or no health insurance plan. Therefore,
the Oregon experiment should provide a better estimate
of the effect of health insurance on the consumption of
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health care, for the particular insurance plan and popu-
lation in the study. The key results of the study indicate
that individuals who were selected by the lottery had
substantially higher health care utilization and better self-
reported health [8]. In terms of health care utilization, the
analysis of the Oregon experiment uses hospital adminis-
trative data and some of the same variables used in this
paper, including total charges and the number of proce-
dures performed.
A number of studies have used natural experiments
resulting from policy decisions. For instance, Antwi et
al. [1] use a difference-in-difference approach analysis to
investigate the effect of health insurance coverage on
hospital admissions based on the provision in the
Affordable Care Act that extends the time young indi-
viduals are allowed to remain in the health insurance
plan of their parents. They estimate that having insur-
ance increases the number of hospital admissions but
has no effect on the “intensity of treatment”, where the
intensity of treatment includes total charges and the
number of procedures performed. Their analysis related
to the intensity of treatment is similar to our analysis in
this paper related to health care consumption, but our
results show that the uninsured have lower total charges
and fewer procedures performed. The difference in the
results may be explained by noting that the analysis in
Antwi et al. [1] includes only young adults.
In addition, Miller [11] investigates the effects of the
health care reform in Massachusetts and concludes that
the reform, which decreased the number of uninsured
individuals, decreased the number of visits to the emer-
gency department, with most of the decrease coming
from non-emergency visits. In a similar study, Kolstad
and Kowalski [9] investigate the effects of the health care
reform in Massachusetts using hospital admissions.
Their results indicate that the reform resulted in a de-
crease in the number of uninsured and a decrease the
number of hospital admissions originating from the
emergency department. This is consistent with our re-
sults, which show that uninsured individuals are more
likely to be admitted to the hospital through the emer-
gency department.
More closely related to our work, Doyle [7] investi-
gates the effects of being uninsured on health care con-
sumption and health outcomes by looking at hospital
admissions induced by automobile accidents. The inter-
pretation is that automobile accidents act as a random
health shock, which allows the researcher to identify the
causal effect of being uninsured. The key results of the
paper indicate that the uninsured consume 20% less
health care and have a substantially higher mortality
rate. The results in Doyle [7] are similar to the results
presented in this paper but our identification strategy is
different, we look at more measures of health care
consumption, and we use a much larger and nationally
representative sample. In particular, our identification
strategy is based on carefully controlling for health con-
ditions, essentially comparing the health care consump-
tion of individuals with the same set of diagnoses. In
addition, our measures of health care consumption in-
clude total charges and length of stay as well as the total
number of procedures, the number of major procedures,
and an indicator for an operating room procedure.
Finally, a number of studies have used survey data to
investigate the health conditions of the uninsured. For
instance, Kronick [10] uses data for multiple years from
the National Health Interview Survey to investigate the
relationship between being uninsured and the risk of
subsequent mortality, as compared to individuals with
employer-provided health insurance. The key result indi-
cates that, after controlling for health conditions and
health behaviors, being uninsured has no effect on the
risk of subsequent mortality. In addition, Polsky et al.
[12] uses data from the Health and Retirement Study in
a quasi-experimental study to investigate whether enroll-
ment in Medicare has an effect on the health of older
and previously uninsured individuals. The study concludes
that enrolling in Medicare has only a small and not statis-
tically significant effect on the health of a previously unin-
sured individual. These results differ from the results
presented in this paper, as we show that uninsured indi-
viduals have higher mortality rates after controlling for
health conditions.
Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study are obtained from the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) National
Inpatient Sample (NIS) database for the year 2011. The
data approximates a 20% sample of U.S. community
hospitals4 and includes all inpatient stays for over 1000
hospitals from 46 states. This database is particularly help-
ful for our study because it provides a comprehensive de-
scription of the medical conditions of the patients and the
medical procedures performed, in addition to information
on the type of insurance and total charges.
Table 1 describes the initial distribution of admissions
by primary expected payer, which we refer to as the type
of insurance. We restrict attention to a comparison of
individuals in the categories “Self-Pay” and “Private In-
surance”. The observations where the primary expected
payer is “Self-Pay” are referred to as “Uninsured” and
the observations where the primary expected payer is
“Private Insurance” are referred to as “Insured”. The rea-
son for restricting attention to observations where the
primary expected payer is self-pay or private insurance is
that uninsured individuals are not eligible for Medicare
or Medicaid, and therefore we think of uninsured indi-
viduals as belonging to the same group as individuals
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with private insurance. In other words, if uninsured indi-
viduals are required to have insurance, they would have
to purchase private insurance. Therefore, they are likely
to behave more like individuals with private insurance
rather than individuals with Medicare or Medicaid.5
Control variables
The key independent variables in the analysis include
insurance status and variables describing the health con-
dition of an individual (DIAGNOSIS variables). Each in-
patient record includes a “primary” diagnosis and up to
24 “secondary” diagnoses. We use the Clinical Classifica-
tion System (CCS) to describe the different diagnoses. In
this classification system, there are a total of 264 differ-
ent diagnoses. In our analysis, we will control for the
primary diagnosis (PRIMARY DIAGNOSIS variable) and
for the full diagnosis vector (DIAGNOSIS VECTOR
variable), which includes the primary diagnosis and the
secondary diagnoses. Table 2 illustrates the nature of the
diagnosis information. In this situation, all three patients
have the same primary diagnosis, but they have different
health conditions as indicated by the secondary diagno-
ses. In our analysis of the health conditions of the unin-
sured, we control only for the primary diagnosis. In our
analysis of the health care consumption of the unin-
sured, we control for the full diagnosis vector.
In addition, we control for individual characteristics
(such as INCOME, GENDER, RACE, and AGE) and
hospital characteristics (such as OWNERSHIP status,
TEACHING status, and LOCATION). Moreover, in our
preferred specifications we include hospital dummy vari-
ables in place of hospital characteristics.
Table 3 describes the distribution of admissions by in-
surance status and individual demographic characteris-
tics. The variable GENDER is a binary variable equal to
one for “female” admissions. For the uninsured, the frac-
tion of male admissions is higher than the fraction of f-
emale admissions. The opposite is true for insured
admissions, where the fraction of male admissions is
considerably lower than the fraction of female admis-
sions. The variable RACE consists of “White”, “Black”,
“Hispanic”, and “Other”. There are some important dif-
ferences across race. Blacks and Hispanics have much
higher fractions of uninsured admissions, while Whites
have the smallest fraction of uninsured admissions. The
variable INCOME gives the national quartile of the
median household income in the patient ZIP code. As
expected, individuals in areas with the lower income
quartiles are more likely to be uninsured, while individ-
uals in areas with the higher income quartile are more
likely to have private insurance.
Table 4 shows the distribution of admissions by insurance
status and hospital characteristics. The “OWNERSHIP”
variable is a binary variable equal to one if the hospital is a
for-profit hospital. Not-for-profit hospitals include not-for-
profit private hospitals as well as public hospitals. The
“LOCATION” variable is a dummy variable equal to
one if the hospital is located in an urban area. Finally,
the “TEACHING” variable is another binary hospital
characteristic, which equals one if the hospital is a
teaching hospital. Teaching hospitals have a residency
program approved by the American Hospital Associ-
ation or have a membership in the Council of Teaching
Hospitals. A large majority of insured and uninsured
patients are admitted to not-for-profit hospitals, but the
fraction of uninsured patients is slightly higher in for-
profit hospitals than in not-for-profit hospital. The
shares of admissions at teaching and non-teaching hos-
pitals are approximately equal, but uninsured patients
are slightly more likely to go to non-teaching hospitals.
The majority of patients are admitted to urban hospi-
tals, with the uninsured being slightly more likely to
show up in rural hospitals.
Health conditions variables
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the health condi-
tion variables. The variable Number of Diagnoses gives
Table 1 Distribution of admissions by type of insurance
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Medicare 3,184,258 39.69 39.69
Medicaid 1,572,766 19.60 59.29
Private 2,549,377 31.77 91.06
Self-Pay 391,615 4.88 95.94
No Charge 38,367 0.48 96.42
Other 264,685 3.30 99.72
. 22,522 0.28 100.00
Total 8,023,590 100.00
Table 2 Examples of primary and secondary diagnoses in a patient’s record
Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3
Primary diagnosis 100. Acute Myocardial Infarction 100. Acute Myocardial Infarction 100. Acute Myocardial Infarction
Secondary diagnoses 101. Coronary Atherosclerosis 101. Coronary Atherosclerosis 131. Respiratory Failure
98. Essential Hypertension 203. Osteoarthritis
53. Disorders of Lipid Metabolism
49. Diabetes
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the number of diagnoses in the patient’s record. Each
diagnosis is categorized as “chronic” or “non-chronic”. A
chronic condition is a condition lasting for a year or
longer and which meets at least one of the following con-
ditions: (a) it places limitations on self-care, independent
living, and social interactions and (b) it results in the need
for ongoing medical care. Chronic conditions include con-
ditions such as diabetes, hypertension, and many forms of
mental illness. Non-chronic conditions include conditions
such as infections, pregnancy, and physical injury. The
variable Number of Chronic Conditions gives the number
of diagnoses categorized as chronic. As illustrated in the
table, compared to individuals with private insurance, un-
insured individuals have a higher average number of diag-
noses and a higher average number of chronic conditions.
The variable Severity of Illness expresses the extent of
physiologic decomposition or organ system loss of func-
tion and has four subclasses: (1) Minor loss of function,
(2) Moderate loss of function, (3) Major loss of function,
(4) Extreme loss of function. The presence of multiple
conditions in combination with the primary diagnosis
determines the severity of illness. An increase in severity
of illness reflects increased difficulty and costs involved
in treating the patient. On average, uninsured patients
have a higher score for severity of illness. Similarly, the
variable Risk of Mortality indicates the assessed likeli-
hood of dying based on the diagnosis information and
includes the following classes: (1) Minor likelihood of
dying, (2) Moderate likelihood of dying, (3) Major likeli-
hood of dying, and (4) Extreme likelihood of dying. On
the other hand, the binary variable Died in Hospital in-
dicates whether a patient actually died in the hospital.
Uninsured individuals have a higher assessed risk of
mortality and a higher mortality rate.
Finally, the variable Emergency Department is a binary
variable equal to one if the admission originated in the
Emergency Department of the hospital. This variable is
based on the “Emergency Department Service” indicator,
which is equal to one when the admission record indi-
cates (1) the Emergency Department as the admission
source, or (2) an Emergency Department revenue code,
or (3) a positive Emergency Department charge, or (4) an
Emergency Department procedure code. As illustrated in
the table, compared to individuals with insurance, unin-
sured individuals are considerably more likely to go
through the Emergency Department of the hospital.
Health care consumption variables
The key dependent variables used in the analysis of
health care consumption include total charges and
Table 3 Distribution of admissions by insurance status and
individual characteristics
Insured Uninsured Total
All 86.68 13.32 100.00
Gender
Male 82.82 17.18 100.00
40.22 54.29 42.09
Female 89.49 10.51 100.00
59.78 45.71 57.91
Race
White 89.14 10.86 100.00
70.87 54.39 68.61
Black 77.25 22.75 100.00
11.29 20.93 12.61
Hispanic 79.00 21.00 100.00
10.45 17.49 11.41
Other 86.63 13.37 100.00
7.40 7.19 7.37
Income
Quartile 1 77.60 22.40 100.00
19.45 37.23 21.78
Quartile 2 84.88 15.12 100.00
22.09 26.09 22.61
Quartile 3 89.29 10.71 100.00
28.79 22.90 28.01
Quartile 4 93.46 6.54 100.00
29.68 13.78 27.59
The numbers in the table indicate the row percentage and the
column percentage





For-profit 83.74 16.26 100.00
12.42 16.01 12.89
Not-for-profit 87.38 12.62 100.00
87.58 83.99 87.11
Teaching
Teaching 87.78 12.22 100.00
50.75 46.93 50.25
Not-teaching 86.04 13.96 100.00
49.25 53.07 49.75
Location
Urban 87.34 12.66 100.00
91.88 88.45 91.43
Rural 82.37 17.63 100.00
8.12 11.55 8.57
The numbers in the table indicate the row percentage and the column percentage
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length of stay, as well as other outcome measures such
as the number of medical procedures performed, the
number of major procedures performed, and an indica-
tor variable for a major operating room procedure.
The variable Total Charges shows the hospital total
charges in dollars for the admission and the variable
Length of Stay gives the length of stay in days. The total
charges consist of “hospital” charges and “professional”
charges. The hospital charges include charges for the
room and nursing care and charges for services like
laboratory tests, medications, and operating room
charges. The professional charges are the charges of
the attending and consulting physicians. For our
purpose of measuring health care consumption, total
charges are a reasonable measure because the total
charges are based on the procedures performed (which
vary across individuals) and the hospital list prices
(which do not vary across individuals or type of insurance).6
This is consistent with the use of total charges in previous
research, where total charges are interpreted “as a price-
weighted summary of treatment” [8].
A characterization of the number and types of proce-
dures performed is contained in the variable PRCLASS,
which contains the number of procedures in each of the
following classes: (1) minor diagnostic (non-operating
room procedures such as CT Scan of Head or Diagnos-
tic Cardiac Catheterization), (2) minor therapeutic
(non-operating room procedure such as Respiratory
Intubation or Circumcision), (3) major diagnostic
(operating room procedure such as Laparoscopy or
Biopsy of Liver), and (4) major therapeutic (operating
room procedure such as Coronary Artery Bypass or
Cesarean Section). The variable Number of Procedures
sums all types of procedures performed. The variable
Number of Major Procedures is constructed to include
major diagnostic and major therapeutic procedures
only. Finally, the variable Operating Room Procedure is
a binary variable equal to one if a major operating room
procedure is performed.
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the health care
consumption variables. The average total charges for un-
insured individuals are lower than the average total
charges for insured individuals. The average number of
procedures is considerably higher for individuals with in-
surance. In addition, insured individuals have a higher
number of major procedures and they are more likely to
get an operating room procedure. The average length of
stay is only slightly longer for uninsured patients.
Methods and Results
In this section, we present the main results of the paper.
First, we provide some results related to the health
conditions of the uninsured. Then, we report the results
related to the health care consumption of the uninsured
as compared to individuals with private insurance.
Table 5 Summary statistics for health conditions variables by insurance status
Insured Uninsured Difference Percentage difference All
86.68 13.32 100.00
Number of diagnoses 6.661 (4.906) 7.068 (4.778) 0.407*** (0.115) 06.11% 6.715 (4.891)
Number of chronic conditions 2.740 (2.931) 3.078 (2.642) 0.338*** (0.0622) 12.33% 2.785 (2.897)
Severity of illness 1.775 (0.857) 1.901 (0.868) 0.126*** (0.0166) 07.10% 1.792 (0.860)
Risk of mortality 1.353 (0.727) 1.417 (0.777) 0.0640*** (0.0118) 04.73% 1.361 (0.734)
Died in hospital 0.0099 (0.099) 0.0140 (0.117) 0.00416*** (0.000858) 41.41% 0.0104 (0.101)
Emergency department 0.353 (0.478) 0.675 (0.469) 0.321*** (0.0109) 91.22% 0.396 (0.489)
The numbers in the table indicate the mean and the standard deviation in parenthesis. The test refers to the difference in means between the insured and
the uninsured
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 6 Summary statistics for health care consumption variables by insurance status
Insured Uninsured Difference Percentage difference Total
86.68 13.32 100.00
Total charges 32,320 (62,650) 29,419 (50,223) −2901*** (990.9) −08.98% 31,923 (61,107)
Length of stay 3.850 (5.966) 3.909 (5.846) 0.0587 (0.0909) 01.53% 3.858 (5.950)
Number of procedures 1.738 (2.011) 1.332 (1.970) −0.406*** (0.0356) −23.36% 1.683 (2.010)
Number of major procedures 0.606 (1.035) 0.354 (0.858) −0.251*** (0.0116) −41.58% 0.572 (1.018)
Operating room procedure 0.377 (0.485) 0.221 (0.415) −0.155*** (0.00569) −41.38% 0.355 (0.479)
The numbers in the table indicate the mean and the standard deviation. The test refers to the difference in means between the insured and the uninsured
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Health conditions variables
The measures we use for health conditions include the
number of diagnoses, number of chronic conditions,
severity of illness, and risk of mortality. For each health
condition variable, we estimated an equation of the
following form
Y ij ¼ β0 þ β1Uninsuredi þ β2Xi þ δj þ ij
where Y ij denotes the health condition of individual i in
hospital j, Xi is a vector of individual demographic char-
acteristics, and δj represents hospital fixed effects. The
individual characteristics contain demographic variables
as well as the primary diagnosis. For robustness, we
additionally estimate the previous equation using hos-
pital characteristics and state fixed effects. The standard
errors are clustered at the hospital level in all specifica-
tions. Hence the estimates of standard errors are accurate
even if model standard errors for discharges from the same
hospital are correlated. In fact, this is likely to be true as the
standard errors that control for within-hospital correlation
are several times larger than default standard errors [4].
Table 7 presents the results for the Number of Diagno-
ses. The results are reported for various sets of controls
to check the robustness of the results and to illustrate
how the results change depending on the set of controls.
The estimate in column (1) is simply the difference in
the average number of diagnoses between the uninsured
Table 7 Results for number of diagnoses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Number of diagnoses Number of diagnoses Number of diagnoses Number of diagnoses Number of diagnoses
Uninsured 0.407*** 0.118 0.103 −0.216*** −0.198***
(0.115) (0.105) (0.0825) (0.0784) (0.0349)
Income Q1 0.277*** 0.435*** 0.301*** 0.353***
(0.0991) (0.0732) (0.0685) (0.0211)
Income Q2 0.196** 0.310*** 0.215*** 0.300***
(0.0887) (0.0774) (0.0740) (0.0178)
Income Q3 0.167*** 0.217*** 0.157*** 0.178***
(0.0532) (0.0447) (0.0414) (0.0121)
Black 0.237*** 0.182*** −0.00280 0.102***
(0.0791) (0.0541) (0.0527) (0.0242)
Hispanic −0.296*** −0.426*** −0.363*** −0.360***
(0.109) (0.0832) (0.0793) (0.0373)
Other −0.313*** −0.387*** −0.374*** −0.288***
(0.0615) (0.0572) (0.0501) (0.0270)
Female −0.531*** −0.519*** −0.0235* −0.0186
(0.0247) (0.0252) (0.0143) (0.0130)
Age 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.0985*** 0.0991***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Primary diagnosis FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.001 0.247 0.266 0.376 0.419
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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and the insured. The uninsured have approximately 0.4
more diagnoses on average (about 6% higher, compared
to the insured). The higher number of diagnoses may be
an indication of worse health conditions. The estimates
in column (2) control for individual characteristics and
the estimates in column (3) additionally control for hos-
pital characteristics and include state fixed effects. The
estimates are considerably lower and no longer statisti-
cally significant, with individual characteristics explain-
ing most of the difference. In particular, individuals
with lower incomes have a higher number of diagno-
ses.7 The results for race are mixed, with Blacks having
a higher number and Hispanics having a lower number
of diagnoses, as compared to Whites. The estimates in
column (4) additionally control for the primary diagno-
sis. Here, the estimated effect for the uninsured is nega-
tive and statistically significant but small (about 3%
lower for the uninsured). In other words, after control-
ling for the primary diagnosis, the uninsured do not ap-
pear to be in worse health conditions. Finally, the results
in column (5) control for individual characteristics, pri-
mary diagnosis, and hospital fixed effects. Including hos-
pital fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable
hospital characteristics. The estimates are similar to the
previous estimates. Overall, the results indicate that on
average uninsured individuals have a higher number of
Table 8 Results for number of chronic conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










Uninsured 0.338*** 0.0829* 0.0751** −0.221*** −0.188***
(0.0622) (0.0423) (0.0312) (0.0304) (0.0191)
Income Q1 0.285*** 0.320*** 0.214*** 0.208***
(0.0416) (0.0321) (0.0264) (0.0118)
Income Q2 0.214*** 0.238*** 0.162*** 0.167***
(0.0388) (0.0353) (0.0314) (0.00900)
Income Q3 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.117*** 0.105***
(0.0240) (0.0211) (0.0164) (0.00694)
Black 0.178*** 0.157*** 0.0295 0.0746***
(0.0339) (0.0241) (0.0214) (0.0136)
Hispanic −0.300*** −0.334*** −0.188*** −0.174***
(0.0419) (0.0343) (0.0291) (0.0181)
Other −0.353*** −0.381*** −0.247*** −0.203***
(0.0352) (0.0320) (0.0225) (0.0153)
Female −0.696*** −0.688*** −0.0591*** −0.0573***
(0.0179) (0.0192) (0.00654) (0.00612)
Age 0.0775*** 0.0774*** 0.0601*** 0.0602***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Primary diagnosis FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.002 0.399 0.408 0.532 0.552
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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diagnoses, but this result is reversed when controlling
for the primary diagnosis. The results are very stable
across the different specifications, which highlights the ro-
bustness of the results.
Table 8 contains the results for the Number of
Chronic Conditions. The results are very similar to
the previous results. The uninsured have approxi-
mately 0.34 more chronic conditions on average
(about 12% higher, compared to the insured). The es-
timated effect becomes smaller but stays positive
when we control for individual characteristics and
hospital characteristics. However, if we control for the
primary diagnosis, the estimated effect for the unin-
sured is negative and statistically significant (about
7% lower for the uninsured). That is, if we control
for the primary diagnosis, the uninsured actually have
a lower number of chronic conditions.
Tables 9 and 10 present the results for the Severity of
Illness and Risk of Mortality, respectively. The results
parallel the results from the previous health conditions
measures. The uninsured have a higher severity of illness
and a higher risk of mortality on average, but the results
are reversed when we control for the primary diagnosis.
For robustness, we performed a similar analysis using the
binary variables High Severity of Illness (equal to one if se-
verity of illness equals (3) Major loss of function or (4) Ex-
treme loss of function) and High Risk of Mortality (equal
to one if risk of mortality equals (3) Major likelihood of
Table 9 Results for severity of illness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Severity of illness Severity of illness Severity of illness Severity of illness Severity of illness
Uninsured 0.126*** 0.0697*** 0.0670*** −0.0205** −0.0135**
(0.0166) (0.0148) (0.0115) (0.00920) (0.00647)
Income Q1 0.0486*** 0.0629*** 0.0351*** 0.0434***
(0.0130) (0.00821) (0.00623) (0.00370)
Income Q2 0.0333*** 0.0467*** 0.0269*** 0.0386***
(0.0123) (0.00971) (0.00829) (0.00303)
Income Q3 0.0200*** 0.0256*** 0.0152*** 0.0203***
(0.00760) (0.00574) (0.00432) (0.00232)
Black 0.0957*** 0.0813*** 0.0537*** 0.0566***
(0.0118) (0.00687) (0.00562) (0.00370)
Hispanic −0.0120 −0.0260*** −0.0118* −0.0112***
(0.0140) (0.00865) (0.00707) (0.00339)
Other −0.00968 −0.0223*** −0.00578 −0.00247
(0.0113) (0.00847) (0.00610) (0.00393)
Female −0.158*** −0.154*** −0.0389*** −0.0375***
(0.00367) (0.00370) (0.00171) (0.00164)
Age 0.0129*** 0.0130*** 0.00961*** 0.00981***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Primary diagnosis FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,937,203 2,570,871 2,534,240 2,534,240 2,570,871
R-squared 0.002 0.131 0.144 0.311 0.325
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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dying or (4) Extreme likelihood of dying) and we obtained
the same pattern of results.
The previous results indicate that the uninsured are in
worse health conditions on average but are in better
health conditions when controlling for the primary diag-
nosis. The results are not inconsistent with each other
and have an intuitive interpretation. In particular, unin-
sured individuals are more likely to be admitted to the
hospital for more serious conditions, which are associated
with a higher number of diagnoses and chronic conditions
and a higher severity of illness and risk of mortality. For
instance, compared to individuals with private insurance,
the uninsured are more likely to be admitted to the hos-
pital for Endocrine, Nutritional, and Metabolic diseases
(which includes diabetes) and for (ii) Circulatory System
diseases (which includes hypertension and myocardial in-
farction). These results are consistent with the existing
literature and the general perceptions about the health
conditions of the uninsured. However, once we compare
individuals with the same primary diagnosis, the unin-
sured are actually in better health condition, a result that
does not appear in the literature.
In addition, the existing literature indicates the unin-
sured are more likely to use the Emergency Department
to access the healthcare system [11]. We estimated our
basic model using the Emergency Department variable,
which is a binary variable equal to one if the admission
originated in the Emergency Department of the hospital.
Table 10 Results for risk of mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Risk of mortality Risk of mortality Risk of mortality Risk of mortality Risk of mortality
Uninsured 0.0640*** 0.0113 0.00788 −0.0291*** −0.0248***
(0.0118) (0.01000) (0.00811) (0.00520) (0.00415)
Income Q1 0.0418*** 0.0436*** 0.0247*** 0.0296***
(0.00890) (0.00553) (0.00387) (0.00327)
Income Q2 0.0272*** 0.0318*** 0.0185*** 0.0254***
(0.00757) (0.00548) (0.00424) (0.00247)
Income Q3 0.0151*** 0.0158*** 0.00819*** 0.0121***
(0.00469) (0.00361) (0.00259) (0.00196)
Black 0.0611*** 0.0534*** 0.0335*** 0.0353***
(0.00752) (0.00559) (0.00388) (0.00257)
Hispanic 0.00964 −0.00347 0.00528 0.00495
(0.0102) (0.00662) (0.00498) (0.00305)
Other 0.0177** 0.00841 0.00563 0.0112***
(0.00736) (0.00664) (0.00471) (0.00330)
Female −0.173*** −0.171*** −0.0591*** −0.0583***
(0.00309) (0.00315) (0.00137) (0.00132)
Age 0.0117*** 0.0117*** 0.0112*** 0.0112***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Primary diagnosis FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,937,203 2,570,871 2,534,240 2,534,240 2,570,871
R-squared 0.001 0.148 0.155 0.344 0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Unlike the study above, our data includes emergency
room visits that result in hospitalization. Hence, we only
observe real emergencies. In that sense our estimate
provides a lower bound on the difference of emergency
department utilization between the insured and the un-
insured. Table 11 describes the results. The estimate in
column (1) is simply the difference in the fraction of ad-
missions originating in the Emergency Department of
the hospital between the uninsured and the insured.
Hence, conditional on being admitted to the hospital,
the uninsured have a substantially higher probability of
having been transferred from the Emergency Depart-
ment to the hospital (about 90% higher, compared to the
insured). The estimated effect remains positive and
highly statistically significant in all of the specifications.
Using the estimate from our preferred specification in
Column (5), which controls for individual characteristics,
the full diagnosis vector, and hospital fixed effects, the
probability of being admitted to the hospital through the
Emergency Department is approximately 38% higher for
the uninsured compared to the insured.
Finally, another indicator of the health conditions of
the uninsured frequently mentioned in the literature is
the actual mortality rate. Therefore, we estimated our
basic model using the variable Died in Hospital, which
is a binary variable equal to one if the individual died
in the hospital. Table 12 describes the results. As be-
fore, the estimate in column (1) is the difference in the
Table 11 Results for emergency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Emergency Emergency Emergency Emergency Emergency
Uninsured 0.321*** 0.291*** 0.287*** 0.144*** 0.134***
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.00949) (0.00732) (0.00580)
Income Q1 0.00182 0.0190** −0.00758 0.00318
(0.0123) (0.00853) (0.00691) (0.00620)
Income Q2 −0.0103 0.00559 −0.0104* −0.00253
(0.0105) (0.00780) (0.00605) (0.00469)
Income Q3 −0.00186 0.0134** 0.00366 0.00280
(0.00816) (0.00588) (0.00439) (0.00300)
Black 0.106*** 0.0924*** 0.0643*** 0.0604***
(0.00866) (0.00685) (0.00533) (0.00522)
Hispanic 0.0475*** 0.0339*** 0.0352*** 0.0187***
(0.0107) (0.00720) (0.00499) (0.00306)
Other −0.0316*** −0.0329*** 0.000951 0.000844
(0.0101) (0.00779) (0.00523) (0.00318)
Female −0.105*** −0.105*** −0.0205*** −0.0209***
(0.00577) (0.00571) (0.00147) (0.00138)
Age 0.00645*** 0.00636*** 0.000505*** 0.000444***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.050 0.158 0.201 0.428 0.460
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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probability of dying in the hospital between the unin-
sured and the insured. The uninsured have a substan-
tially higher probability of dying (about 42% higher,
compared to the insured). The estimated effect remains
positive and highly statistically significant in all of the
specifications. The estimate in our preferred specifica-
tion in column (5), which includes individual character-
istics, the full diagnosis vector, and hospital fixed
effects, indicates the probability of dying in the hospital
is about 35% higher for the uninsured as compared to
the insured. This result is surprising because we are con-
trolling for the full diagnosis vector. Of course, the prob-
ability of dying depends on the health conditions of a
patient as well as on the medical procedures performed.
In other words, if an individual has a heart attack, the in-
dividual is less likely to die if the appropriate medical pro-
cedures are performed. Therefore, an explanation for this
result may become more apparent after we look at the dif-
ferences in the consumption of health care between the
insured and the uninsured.
Health care consumption variables
The following results relate to the health care consump-
tion variables, which include total charges, number of
procedures, number of major procedures, an indicator
of an operating room procedure, and length of stay. We
estimate the same basic model as in the previous
Table 12 Results for mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Hospital death Hospital death Hospital death Hospital death Hospital death
Uninsured 0.00416*** 0.00247*** 0.00237** 0.00320*** 0.00350***
(0.000858) (0.000946) (0.000960) (0.000935) (0.000983)
Income Q1 0.00195*** 0.00188*** 0.00127** 0.000428
(0.000683) (0.000521) (0.000496) (0.000291)
Income Q2 0.000473 0.000814** 0.000326 0.000027
(0.000552) (0.000389) (0.000354) (0.000240)
Income Q3 −0.000250 −0.0000215 −0.000209 −0.000199
(0.000424) (0.000333) (0.000303) (0.000208)
Black 0.000616 0.000294 0.000600** 0.000445*
(0.000443) (0.000361) (0.000300) (0.000239)
Hispanic 0.000548 0.000217 0.000722** 0.000459*
(0.000430) (0.000428) (0.000352) (0.000264)
Other 0.00250*** 0.00188*** 0.000430 0.000232
(0.000462) (0.000424) (0.000362) (0.000305)
Female −0.00477*** −0.00467*** 0.00145*** 0.00150***
(0.000194) (0.000193) (0.000176) (0.000174)
Age 0.000414*** 0.000417*** 0.000346*** 0.000338***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,936,294 2,570,122 2,533,564 2,533,564 2,570,122
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.010 0.200 0.204
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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section, but now the dependent variable refers to the
health consumption variables.
Table 13 shows the results for Total Charges in dollars.
Column (1) indicates that the total charges for the unin-
sured are about $2900 less on average (about 9% less com-
pared with the insured). The estimates in column (2)
control for individual characteristics and the estimates in
column (3) additionally control for hospital characteristics
and state fixed effects. This increases the gap between the
insured and the uninsured, the latter paying about $5000
less on average (about 15% less compared to the insured).
The estimates in column (4) additionally controls for the
full diagnosis vector. This allows us to compare individuals
with similar health conditions based on their insurance
status. The estimates in column (5) control for individual
characteristics, the full diagnosis vector, and hospital fixed
effects, which is our preferred set of controls. The esti-
mated effect of being uninsured is consistently negative
and statistically significant. The estimate in column (5) in-
dicates the uninsured are charged about $1900 less on
average (about 6% less, compared to the insured). Finally,
the estimates in column (5) indicate that Blacks and
Hispanics have lower total charges (compared to
Whites), females have lower total charges (compared to
males), and the total charges increase with age. The es-
timates in column (3) or column (4), which control for
Table 13 Results for total charges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Total charges Total charges Total charges Total charges Total charges Total charges
Uninsured −2901*** −5039*** −4431*** −2820*** −1918*** 454.5
(990.9) (1007) (633.6) (455.6) (275.8) (302.2)
Income Q2 1345** 1068** 920.1** 614.9*** 259.3
(605.4) (499.2) (390.8) (232.9) (192.5)
Income Q3 2407** 369.5 1252** 482.4* 184.7
(1062) (690.6) (548.9) (274.7) (233.9)
Income Q4 2521 135.9 1340* 92.68 −371.6
(1652) (979.6) (789.5) (339.3) (291.1)
Black 1080 241.5 697.1 −1285*** 860.6***
(1097) (735.8) (557.1) (356.1) (251.8)
Hispanic 5456*** −2167** −372.9 −1389*** −941.8***
(1423) (944.2) (812.2) (267.0) (238.3)
Other 2212* −994.2 774.2 −302.5 −394.5
(1263) (911.5) (570.3) (516.1) (456.0)
Female −8620*** −8188*** −1030*** −923.0*** −462.6***
(536.6) (423.7) (180.3) (164.0) (127.6)
Age 532.4*** 522.5*** 23.54* 41.17*** 124.5***







State FE No No Yes Yes No No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes No
Procedure vector FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 2,834,320 2,475,053 2,438,353 2,438,353 2,475,053 2,475,053
R-squared 0.000 0.043 0.079 0.344 0.378 0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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hospital characteristics, indicate that total charges are
higher in for-profit hospitals, in urban hospitals, and in
teaching hospitals.
Our previous results on health condition variables
show that controlling for primary diagnosis, the unin-
sured are not in worse health conditions compared to
the insured. However, the current estimates include the
full set of diagnoses, not just the primary diagnosis.
Hence, we conclude that, after controlling for the health
conditions of a patient, the uninsured consume less
healthcare. This suggests that the uninsured receive
fewer procedures and/or less expensive procedures. As a
test of this hypothesis, the estimates in Column (6)
control for the full procedure vector in place of the full
diagnosis vector. Once we control for the particular set
of procedures that patients get, the difference between
the insured and the uninsured disappears (the estimate
is considerably smaller and not statistically significant).
This supports the idea that the uninsured have lower
total charges because they consume less health care.8
The results for Number of Procedures are reported in
Table 14. The results indicate that the uninsured get
fewer procedures compared to the insured. The results
in column (5), which control for individual characteris-
tics, the full diagnosis vector, and hospital fixed effects,
show the uninsured are getting about 8% fewer proce-
dures. The estimated effect of being uninsured on the
number of procedures gets smaller in absolute value
Table 14 Results for number of procedures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Number of procedures Number of procedures Number of procedures Number of procedures Number of procedures
Uninsured −0.406*** −0.417*** −0.384*** −0.148*** −0.135***
(0.0356) (0.0341) (0.0234) (0.0158) (0.0102)
Income Q2 0.0947*** 0.0639*** 0.0347** 0.0190**
(0.0247) (0.0208) (0.0173) (0.00787)
Income Q3 0.0911*** 0.00347 −0.00767 0.00890
(0.0288) (0.0208) (0.0142) (0.00907)
Income Q4 0.135*** 0.00725 −0.00313 0.00870
(0.0432) (0.0277) (0.0208) (0.0106)
Black −0.105*** −0.185*** −0.0964*** −0.0913***
(0.0323) (0.0285) (0.0210) (0.0118)
Hispanic −0.000980 −0.0890*** −0.101*** −0.0531***
(0.0368) (0.0294) (0.0237) (0.0118)
Other 0.135*** 0.0566** −0.0238 −0.0230*
(0.0402) (0.0268) (0.0182) (0.0119)
Female −0.0793*** −0.0637*** −0.153*** −0.153***
(0.0181) (0.0164) (0.00648) (0.00611)
Age 0.0134*** 0.0139*** 0.00220*** 0.00243***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.005 0.029 0.049 0.372 0.403
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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when we control for the full diagnosis vector. This sug-
gests the uninsured are getting fewer procedures par-
tially because they are in better health conditions.
However, even if we control for the full diagnosis vector,
the coefficient is still negative and statistically significant.
That is, uninsured individuals get a smaller number of
procedures when compared to insured individuals with
the same diagnosis vector. This supports our claim that
total charges are smaller for the uninsured because they
consume less health care.
In addition, these results are consistent with, and help
explain, our previous findings regarding total charges. In
particular, Black and Hispanic patients are getting a
smaller number of procedures compared to Whites,
females get fewer procedures compared to males, and
the number of procedures performed increases with age.
Finally, the results in column (4) indicate that there is
no significant difference between for-profit and non-
profit hospitals in terms of the number of procedures
[5], but as expected patients get more procedures in
urban hospitals and in teaching hospitals.
For robustness, we performed a similar analysis using
the variables Number of Major Procedures and Operating
Room Procedure. Table 15 presents the results for the
number of major procedures and Table 16 show the re-
sults for the indicator variable of an operating room
Table 15 Results for number of major procedures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)










Uninsured −0.251*** −0.255*** −0.251*** −0.119*** −0.110***
(0.0116) (0.0113) (0.00983) (0.00599) (0.00481)
Income Q2 0.0379*** 0.0384*** 0.0195*** 0.0121***
(0.00922) (0.00875) (0.00532) (0.00399)
Income Q3 0.0281** 0.0146* 0.00572 0.00831*
(0.0114) (0.00867) (0.00504) (0.00477)
Income Q4 0.0409*** 0.0331*** 0.0157** 0.0108
(0.0155) (0.0119) (0.00736) (0.00663)
Black −0.0869*** −0.107*** −0.0706*** −0.0682***
(0.0112) (0.0105) (0.00626) (0.00628)
Hispanic −0.0395*** −0.0550*** −0.0593*** −0.0508***
(0.0131) (0.00934) (0.00601) (0.00447)
Other −0.0602*** −0.0688*** −0.0421*** −0.0428***
(0.0105) (0.00980) (0.00575) (0.00537)
Female −0.0646*** −0.0599*** −0.146*** −0.146***
(0.00662) (0.00638) (0.00589) (0.00584)
Age 0.00565*** 0.00571*** 0.00274*** 0.00295***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.007 0.026 0.034 0.362 0.375
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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procedure. Based on our preferred specification in col-
umn (5), the number of major procedures is 18% lower
for the uninsured and the probability of getting an oper-
ating room procedure is 17% lower for the uninsured
compared to the insured. The qualitative implications
are the same as for the number of procedures. In par-
ticular, uninsured patients get a smaller number of pro-
cedures, fewer major procedures, and are less likely to
get an operating room procedure.
The regression results for Length of Stay are displayed
in Table 17. The coefficient on insurance status is nega-
tive but not statistically significant, indicating that the
length of stay for the uninsured is not different from that
of the insured. The coefficient on the gender dummy
changes sign when we include the full diagnosis vector.
Females, on average, have a shorter length of stay, but if
we compare different genders with the same diagnosis
vector, females tend to have a longer length of stay.9 This
suggests female patients are in general admitted to hospi-
tals with conditions that require shorter stays. The coeffi-
cient on age is positive but becomes insignificant once we
control for the diagnosis vector. Controlling for the diag-
nosis vector, Blacks and Hispanics have a longer length of
stay. If the length of stay and the number of procedures
(possibly, the type of procedures as well) determine the
total charges, then the fact that Black and Hispanic
Table 16 Results for operating room procedure











Uninsured −0.155*** −0.158*** −0.156*** −0.0686*** −0.0627***
(0.00569) (0.00585) (0.00581) (0.00400) (0.00324)
Income Q2 0.0166*** 0.0180*** 0.00691*** 0.00537***
(0.00399) (0.00361) (0.00214) (0.00194)
Income Q3 0.0208*** 0.0167*** 0.00698*** 0.00497**
(0.00512) (0.00393) (0.00240) (0.00229)
Income Q4 0.0278*** 0.0264*** 0.0119*** 0.00681**
(0.00653) (0.00543) (0.00351) (0.00337)
Black −0.0467*** −0.0552*** −0.0396*** −0.0352***
(0.00541) (0.00474) (0.00287) (0.00299)
Hispanic −0.0189*** −0.0218*** −0.0406*** −0.0353***
(0.00493) (0.00410) (0.00345) (0.00286)
Other −0.0264*** −0.0276*** −0.0322*** −0.0314***
(0.00503) (0.00492) (0.00332) (0.00296)
Female −0.0739*** −0.0726*** −0.132*** −0.133***
(0.00413) (0.00421) (0.00545) (0.00544)
Age 0.00142*** 0.00144*** 0.00170*** 0.00181***







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,992 2,572,821 2,536,120 2,536,120 2,572,821
R-squared 0.012 0.025 0.031 0.379 0.389
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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patients cost less despite staying longer implies the inten-
sity of care they receive is substantially less.
As a summary, our results from the analysis of the
health care consumption variables indicate that unin-
sured individuals consume less health care. In particular,
if we compare insured and uninsured individuals with
the same diagnosis vector, who are treated at the same
hospital, the uninsured have lower total charges, a
smaller number of procedures, and a smaller probability
of having an operating room procedure. The difference
in the health care consumption of the insured and the
uninsured may help explain why the uninsured have a
higher mortality rate.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper attempts to take a closer look at the health
conditions and the health care consumption patterns of
the uninsured compared to the insured using a nation-
ally representative inpatient dataset from the US. A key
advantage of using inpatient administrative data is that
an inpatient record includes comprehensive information
about the health conditions and the health care con-
sumption of an individual. As has been noted in the lite-
rature, it can be challenging to identify the causal effect
of having health insurance because insured and unin-
sured individuals may have different characteristics.
Therefore, our identification strategy is based on
Table 17 Results for length of stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Length of stay Length of stay Length of stay Length of stay Length of stay
Uninsured 0.0587 −0.134 −0.111 −0.0899 −0.0556
(0.0909) (0.0948) (0.0853) (0.0652) (0.0525)
Income Q2 −0.0963** −0.0767* −0.0376 0.00722
(0.0464) (0.0424) (0.0370) (0.0264)
Income Q3 −0.190*** −0.220*** −0.112*** −0.00603
(0.0650) (0.0521) (0.0414) (0.0255)
Income Q4 −0.200** −0.248*** −0.120*** −0.0220
(0.0882) (0.0564) (0.0441) (0.0326)
Black 0.422*** 0.303*** 0.250*** 0.199***
(0.0631) (0.0572) (0.0457) (0.0425)
Hispanic −0.0648 −0.171*** 0.0545 0.0578**
(0.0779) (0.0559) (0.0388) (0.0229)
Other 0.171** 0.0795 0.201*** 0.177***
(0.0786) (0.0578) (0.0372) (0.0269)
Female −0.564*** −0.530*** 0.0523*** 0.0639***
(0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0145) (0.0138)
Age 0.0225*** 0.0229*** 0.00153 0.000481







State FE No No Yes Yes No
Hospital FE No No No No Yes
Diagnosis vector FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,940,954 2,572,789 2,536,088 2,536,088 2,572,789
R-squared 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.339 0.362
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the hospital level
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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carefully controlling for health conditions, essentially
comparing the health care consumption of individuals
with the same set of diagnoses treated at the same
hospital.
First, we find that conditional on being admitted to
the hospital the uninsured are, on average, in worse
health conditions. This is a result frequently cited in
the literature. However, if we control for the primary
diagnoses, the uninsured are actually in better health
conditions than the insured. Surprisingly, this is not a
well-known finding in the literature. These results to-
gether imply that uninsured individuals go to the hos-
pital for more serious reasons that are associated with a
higher number of chronic conditions and a higher
severity of illness and risk of mortality. For instance,
compared to individuals with private insurance, the
uninsured are more likely to be admitted to the hospital
for conditions related to the Circulatory System (such
as Acute Myocardial Infarction) but are less likely to be
admitted to the hospital for conditions related to the
Musculoskeletal System (such as Rheumatoid Arthritis).
Therefore, studies that compare health conditions of the
uninsured and the insured based on inpatient data can be
misleading. They are comparing very sick uninsured indi-
viduals, who have no choice but to go the hospital, to the
insured, which may include patients with less severe or
non-urgent conditions. We do not observe the uninsured
with less severe or non-urgent conditions in the data simply
because they do not go the hospital.
Second, the uninsured are more likely to be admitted
to the hospital through the Emergency Department, and
are more likely to die at the hospital. These findings are
consistent with the existing literature. These results per-
sist even if we control for the full diagnosis vector. Some
researchers argue that the uninsured may choose to seek
care in the emergency room because, unlike private phy-
sicians, emergency rooms are legally obligated to treat
people, even if they cannot pay for services. Our data
includes emergency room visits that result in
hospitalization. Hence, we only observe real emergen-
cies. In that sense our estimate provides a lower bound
on the difference of Emergency Department utilization
between the insured and the uninsured. The probability
of dying in the hospital is about 35% higher for the unin-
sured as compared to the insured. If uninsured individ-
uals are more likely to die compared to insured
individuals with similar health conditions, this may indi-
cate that the quality or intensity of the health care they
receive is potentially different.
Third, again conditional on being admitted to the
hospital, the uninsured consume less health care. They
have smaller total charges, receive a smaller number of
procedures, and are less likely to get an operating room
procedure. In our analysis, to control for possible
differences in health conditions, we include the full diag-
nosis vector. In addition, we control for individual charac-
teristics and hospital fixed effects. This implies that when
we compare insured and uninsured individuals with the
same set of diagnoses, who are treated at the same hos-
pital, the uninsured have lower total charges. The differ-
ence disappears when we control for the set of procedures
in place of the set of diagnoses. This reveals that the unin-
sured have lower total charges because they are getting
fewer and/or less costly procedures. In this study we only
look at the number of procedures. The question of
whether the uninsured get alternative and less expensive
procedures compared to the insured is left as future
research.
The results of this study suggest that providing health
insurance coverage to the millions of Americans without
health insurance is likely to improve the health conditions
of the uninsured but may result in higher healthcare costs.
First, the results imply that uninsured individuals go to
the hospital for more serious conditions and are consider-
ably more likely to be admitted through the Emergency
Department. Therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that
the uninsured individuals are not getting the necessary
care in a timely manner and frequently seek care only
when their condition deteriorates to the point of requiring
hospitalization. In this situation, providing coverage to the
uninsured is likely to improve health conditions and may
actually lower healthcare costs by providing treatment at
an early stage and decreasing the use of emergency care.
On the other hand, our results indicate that the uninsured
consume less health care. This suggests that providing
coverage to the uninsured may increase healthcare cost by
increasing the intensity of treatment and by allowing
previously uninsured individuals to get care for non-
emergency or elective procedures. Finally, the results
related to in-hospital mortality rates, combined with our
previous results, suggest that providing coverage to the
uninsured is likely to lower the in-hospital mortality rates
of the uninsured.
Endnotes
1The authors use the National Health and Nutritional
Examination Survey and conclude that Medicare cover-
age facilitates outpatient physician care and improves
blood pressure control.
2In general, an individual with health insurance may
consume more health care in any given visit to the
hospital and may visit the hospital more frequently.
We cannot tell if an individual visited the hospital
multiple times during the period of analysis. There-
fore, our analysis is only a partial test of the “over
consumption” effect associated with having health
insurance.
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3In addition, Bajari et al. [3] estimate a structural
model of health insurance and healthcare consumption
using data from a large self-insured employer and report
evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard.
4The universe of U.S. community hospitals is divided
into strata using various hospital characteristics and the
hospitals in the sample are a stratified probability sample,
with sampling probabilities proportional to the number of
hospitals in each stratum.
5This is similar to the sample selection in Kronick
[10], who compares the uninsured to individuals with
employer-provided health insurance.
6The total charges are not equal to the “allowed
charges,” which are the actual charges to the individual
or insurance company. Generally, an insurance company
will negotiate prices with a hospital to determine the
allowed charges. In addition, the allowed charges for
uninsured individuals are frequently considerably lower
than the total charges.
7The income measure is an imprecise measure of the
true income of a patient. Moreover, because income is
correlated with being uninsured and with health con-
ditions, this may bias the estimated effect of being un-
insured towards poor health. However, because the
results already show that the uninsured are not in
worse health conditions, this actually strengthens the
results.
8For robustness, we performed a similar analysis using
the natural log of total charges and obtained very similar
results.
9The coefficient is positive and significant even if we
omit maternal admissions.
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